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Incentive problem is the core issues of organization theory. The classic incentive 
theory suggests that people are averse to work, and thus efforts are expensive, so in 
order to induce agents to work hard, the principals must pay a certain remuneration. 
Because of the asymmetry of information,such as the non-observability of the 
agents’ability to the principals in advance or something in the production process is 
difficult supervisory function, the principals must commit to a pre-incentive contract, 
in accordance with the provisions of subsequent level of performance（ if the 
performance can be observed and confirmed）, according to which the principals 
compensate the agent's efforts. By ignoring the human behavior behind other 
important social psychological factors, the predictions of the standard incentive theory 
are far from economic reality. Social Psychology believes that social preferences,  
such as social approval, reciprocity behavior and interest in the work and so on will 
affect individual behavior. When monetary incentives interact with these internal 
factors, the incentive effect will inevitably be affected, resulting in the hidden costs of 
incentives. Economists have done extensive experiments and empirical observation,  
also confirmed that human behavior is driven not only by monetary motives, but also 
driven by non-monetary motives. If we study human behavior by ignoring the social 
psychological factors of human motivation, we will inevitably lead to economic 
theory of human behavior and its economic consequences are very different with 
economic realities. 
This paper argues that once taking into account the agent's intrinsic motivation 
and social norms, the effect of incentives may be compromised and even 
counterproductive. Through an asymmetric information game analysis framework,  
we taking into account the effects of the intrinsic motivation which impact the 
incentive mechanism may have in the labor market and within the organizations. We 













the information on the work itself（eg, complex, boring, or inhuman）, the organization 
should hire the agents with preferences in line with the organization's own objectives, 
rather than simply to pay higher wages, to attract agents with low intrinsic motivation; 
due to the asymmetry of information, organizational incentives are likely to generate 
an error agent expectations, and thus crowd out the intrinsic motivation of agents, 
which makes incentives can not achieve the desired effect; and, when the number of 
agents becomes more and more in the organization, the norms will also affect the 
incentive effect of the organizations. Finally, we examine the impacts of the intrinsic 
motivation and organizational norms on business organizations, governmental 
organizations and non-profit organization's structure and behavior.  
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